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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this court on appeal:
(1)

Did the trial court err in finding that "Plaintiff

accepted this settlement offer of $34,536.62" despite the express
written

provision

of the offer that an acceptance would be

effective only upon execution of a written agreement by the
parties?

A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a

clearly erroneous standard, Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P2d
1282, 1286 (Utah 1983). See also Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v.
Sohm, 755 P2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1988).
(2)

Did the trial court err in failing to recognize and

enforce the parties' express agreement that modifications to the
January

1989

contract

were

to

be made

by

separate written

agreement signed by both parties?
Interpretation of unambiguous terms of a contract is a matter
of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness without
any deference to the trial court's interpretation of the contract.
Brown v. Weis, 871 P2d 552 (Utah App 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Group, 868 P2d 110, 112 (Utah App 1994).
(3)

Did the trial court err in applying the principles of

the legal doctrine of accord and satisfaction to conclude that
HRCG owes Crouse $20,536.62 in addition to the $14,000 already
paid?
Interpretation and application of common law are questions of
law which are reviewed for correctness with no deference to the
1

lower court's determination.

Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P2d 777,

778-79 (Utah 1992).
(4)

Did the trial court err in concluding that HRCG paid

$14,000 in partial satisfaction of an accord?
The standard of review is the same as in (3) above. See also
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P2d 880,
885 (Utah 1993) (conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness).
(5)

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

failing

to

apply

the

principles of contract law in making a determination of whether a
modification or novation of the January 1989 contract had been
properly accomplished or an accord clearly reached?
Though the trial court did not enter a conclusion that the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction applied rather than principles
of contract law, it may be inferred that such a conclusion was
reached.

The standard of review is the same as in (4) above.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions which are
determinative as to the issues raised.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This dispute arises from a January 1989 contract for the
performance of services between Human Resources Consulting Group,
Inc. (HRCG) and Barbara Crouse in which Ms. Crouse agreed to
provide consulting services and demonstrations on behalf of HRCG
in turn for compensation pursuant to the terms of the contract.
In November of 1989, the nature of the services provided by Crouse
to HRCG changed.

After the change, Crouse performed customer

service work at the direction of HRCG until October 1990 at which
2

time she claimed that she was being undercompensated.
The

parties

subsequently

entered

into

negotiations

for

modification of the contract without entering into a written
modification as required by the original contract.

During the

negotiations, HRCG responded to Crouse's need for money and,
attempting to show good faith, paid to Crouse $14,000 pending a
final agreement on the contract modification.

A few days after

accepting the money, Crouse notified HRCG that she had accepted
employment with another company. She subsequently commenced legal
action claiming she was owed a balance of $20,536.62 under a
"negotiated

compromise

to the disputes

over

the

Independent

Contractors Agreement".
It is important to note that plaintiff did not make a claim
for breach of quasi-contract or for services rendered outside the
contract.

The sole argument is that the parties entered into a

modification of the contract along with an accord and satisfaction
pursuant to which plaintiff is owed additional money.
The trial court entered
findings that

judgment

for Crouse based upon

(1) the parties had agreed that the liquidated

amount of Crouse's claim was $34,536.62, (2) the parties had
reached an accord (3) HRCG had made a partial satisfaction of the
accord by paying the $14,000, and (4) the balance of $20,536.62
was due to Crouse.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
a

On or about January 15, 1989, Barbara Crouse entered into

contract

with

HRCG

to

provide

consulting

services

and

demonstrations on behalf of HRCG for which Ms. Crouse was to be
compensated as an independent contractor (the "Agreement").
3

The

Agreement contained an express provision that it could be modified
only by a written modification signed by both parties.
2.

R 5-8.

In November 1989, the nature of the services provided by

Crouse to HRCG changed.

She now provided customer service work to

HRCG clients, an additional task made possible by termination of
another project she was working on pursuant to the contract. T
15:18-23; 39:20 through 41:7.
3.

In October 1990 Crouse made a claim to HRCG that she was

being undercompensated pursuant to the terms of the agreement. At
the

invitation

of

approximately $48,600.

HRCG,

Crouse

submitting

billings

for

R 52, referring to trial exhibits 3-8; T

17:11-19, 18:15-24.
4.

HRCG questioned some of the invoices presented by Crouse

and disputed the total amount due.

Wishing to continue its

working arrangement with Crouse, HRCG on October 2, 1990 prepared
and presented to Crouse a "Compromise/Offer" which set forth
HRCG's evaluation of the amounts due to Crouse, offered to pay
$24,661.62
modification

for
for

services

rendered,

and

proposed

future

services.

T

105:23-25,

a

contract
106:21-25;

Plaintiffs Exhibit 9.
5. On October 4, 1990, HRCG prepared and presented to Crouse
a modified "Compromise/Offer".
6.

Plaintiff's exhibit 11.

Both the October 2 and October 4 offers expressly pro-

vided that an acceptance of the offer would be effective only upon
execution of a written agreement by the parties.
7.

HRCG did not want to be bound by anything short of a

final written agreement and, to that end, the letters suggesting
negotiation were sent unsigned.

T 99:12-23, T 114:6-19.
4

8.

HRCG's desire in negotiating with Crouse rather than

relying on strict interpretation of the Agreement was motivated by
a desire to satisfy Crouse and to permit the continuation of their
contractual relationship.
9.

On October

T 106:17-25, 110:10-12.

18, 1990 Crouse wrote a letter to HRCG

indicating that she was in agreement with the terms of the October
4 offer except for the provisions of paragraph 8c.

T 24:12-25,

25:1-13, 29:19-20.
10.

Subsequent to October 18, several handwritten changes

were made to the face of the October 4 offer.
made

to

the

express

provision

that

an

No changes were

acceptance would

be

effective only upon execution of a written agreement by the
parties.
11.

T 114:6-9.
On October 25, HRCG, recognizing Grouse's need for cash

and operating in good faith that some contract modification would
be reached, paid to Crouse $14,000 by way of check.
12.

On

October

26, Crouse

accepted employment elsewhere.
13.

notified

HRCG

T 113:15-23.
that

she had

T 115:1-6.

On October 31, HRCG, continuing the negotiation of the

unliquidated sums claimed under the contract, made a modified
offer to Crouse based on an evaluation of her invoices. T 115:725,116:4.
14.
from

On or about November 1, 1990, HRCG received a letter

Crouse

formally

advising

that

she was

terminating

her

contract and submitting final time and expense sheets. T. 116:512.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is one governed by the law of contracts which has
5

clearly established guidelines applicable to all of the facts
presented to the trial court.
construed

according

to

its

An unambiguous contract must be
terms

and

effect

given

to

the

provisions which were intended by the parties, at the time of
contracting, which are to be controlling.
The unambiguous contract between the parties provided that
modifications to the contract are to be made only by written
agreement

signed

by

the parties.

Negotiations

for

such

a

modification, amount to offers which, until accepted and put into
writing by both parties, do not meet the requirement for a written
modification.

Verbal or partial acceptance of an offer is not

sufficient acceptance to give rise to a modification or novation
of the original

contract.

For example, it is black-letter

contract law that an offer which is accepted with an exception is
not a mirror image acceptance and legally amounts to a counteroffer.
The

trial

court

did

not

properly

principles of contract law to this case.

apply

the

governing

Instead, it found an

acceptance of a settlement offer where there was no meeting of the
minds or valid consideration and then erroneously applied the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction to find that HRCG owed an
amount beyond the amount already paid to Crouse.
Under controlling contract law, there was no modification or
novation
settlement

of

the

offer.

original
The

contract

and

no

acceptance

judgment of the trial court

therefore, be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
6

of

a

should,

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING THAT HRCG HAD MADE A
SETTLEMENT OFFER OR HAD AGREED TO AN ACCORD.
The trial court found that Crouse and HRCG's president,
Robert Thurston, had met to discuss paragraph 8c (the provisions
of the October 4 offer which Crouse had rejected) and that
Thurston had agreed to pay Crouse a sum of $34,536.62.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Thurston
met again to discuss paragraph 8c. In this
meeting, Thurston agreed to pay Plaintiff an
additional
$5,625
from
paragraph
8c.
Thurston handwrote $5625 below the previous
offer, and Thurston handwrote $34,536.62 at
the bottom of the page. Plaintiff accepted
this settlement offer of $34,536.62.
Findings of Fact # 16, R 62.
There is a large logical leap from the finding that HRCG's
president had written some additional figures on a document which
he

treated

as

"discussion

papers" to the

finding

that the

handwritten numbers constituted a settlement offer.
The evidence in support of these findings is slim.

Crouse

testified that Mr. Thurston had written the figures onto the
October 4 letter.

T 21:11-13, 26:9-11.

She also testified that

HRCG's president agreed to add $5,625 back into the contract and
that $34,536.62 was the amount HRCG owed to her.

T 26:4-8.

She

then testified that HRCG paid her $14,000 as the first payment on
what HRCG owed her.

T 27:18-25,28:1-3.

Neither Crouse nor Thurston initialed the numbers giving any
indication that they had agreed on the figures or that the amounts
were in fact what HRCG owed to Crouse.
Thurston considered the October 4 letter to be "discussion
papers".

T 114:18-19.

As such, it would not be unexpected that
7

he would write on them during negotiations with Crouse.
clear that Thurston

It is

intended that HRCG not be bound by any

agreement which was not reduced to writing signed by both parties.
T 114:3-19.

This is confirmed by the language in the October 2

and October 4 letters requiring a signed written agreement.

That

HRCG paid Crouse $14,000 is not significant and is an insufficient
basis on which to form a conclusion that an accord had been
reached.

Crouse testified that it was not unusual for HRCG to pay

her large sums in advance for items for which she had not yet
submitted bills.
$15,000.

T. 70:3-6.

One such payment had been for

T 70: 7-25, 71:1-20.

Mr.

Thurston

testified

that

modifications to the Agreement.

he

had

T99:20-23.

not

made

oral

He also testified

that HRCG would, from time to time, make payments to Crouse for
amounts for which she had not submitted time records or invoices.
T 100:1-8. Thurston disputed Crouse's claim that he made the notes
on the October 4 letter on which the court bases its finding.
108:12-25.

Thurston

testified

that

he did

not

agree

T

to a

compromise offer, T 114: 3-5, and that he would not have entered
into a compromise offer not signed by both parties.

T 114:6-19.

Thurston testified that on October 26, after the alleged accord
and after the $14,000 payment, Crouse came to him wanting to know
what he was willing to agree to.
could

T 114:23-25.

He told her HRCG

not pay any more money until he had received

invoice

billings for the time period in question so they could continue to
negotiate the matter. T 115:1-6. This does not support a finding
that

a settlement

had been reached, but leads instead to a

conclusion that the parties had not arrived at a final agreement.
8

That Thurston may have written figures on the document which
the parties were negotiating is clearly not determinative.

If

this were the case, no party negotiating a contract would ever
dare write something on a draft or working copy of the contract
for fear that it would be construed against him as an agreement on
his part. The overall weight of the evidence does not support the
trial court's finding that an accord had been entered into by HRCG
and Crouse.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE AND ENFORCE THE
PARTIES' EXPRESS WRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT MODIFICATIONS TO THE
JANUARY 1989 CONTRACT BE MADE ONLY BY SEPARATE WRITTEN
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES.
The Agreement which underlies this entire dispute contains an

express provision requiring any changes to the Agreement be in
writing and signed by both parties.

R. 8

Admittedly, Utah law

permits oral modification of such agreements
circumstances".

"in appropriate

Prince v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co., Inc., 610 P2d

1267f 1269 (Utah 1980).

However, it is clear that HRCG did not

attempt

an

to

enter

into

oral modification

or

supplemental

contract.

Both of HRCG's "compromise" offers (Oct 2 and Oct 4)

contained

language

clearly

indicating

its

intent

that

the

agreement be executed in writing in order for the modification to
be binding.

Further, to avoid any possibility that the offers be

considered binding writings, Thurston intentially sent the letters
without signing them.

If the parties clearly do not want to be

bound by legal consequences of negotiations until an agreement has
9

been signed, there can be no agreement.
There does not appear to be any doubt that if
the parties make it clear that they do not
intend
that
there
should
be
legal
consequences
unless
and until
a
formal
writing is executed, there is no contract
until that time.
Engineering Associates v. Irving Place Associates. 622 P2d 784,
787 (Utah 1980), citations omitted, emphasis added.
The evidence at trial, supported by the language in the Oct 2
and Oct 4 letters, leads to the conclusion that HRCG did not wish
to enter into an enforceable agreement absent a writing signed by
both parties.
Q.

. . . Did you at that time agree to any
compromise offer?
No.
Okay.
Would
you
have
made
any
compromise offer if it had not been in
writing signed by both parties?
I would not.
And why would you not?
Well, based on several things. My prior
experience with other people that had
worked
with
our
firm,
my
current
arrangement, every single letter that I
sent Ms. Crouse says all changes need to
be made in writing signed by both
parties.
That was the way we were
operating under this agreement. That is
why even on these letters that were sent
they were not signed by me because they
were merely discussion papers for us to
look at.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

T 114:3-19.
The trial court

failed to recognize that

(1) it was the

intent of HRCG that all modifications and subsequent agreements be
in writing, (2) it was the intent of HRCG that the "compromise"
discussions not result in a binding agreement until reduced to
writing
related

signed
to

by

the

both

parties,

Agreement

and
10

and
to

(3) that
the

HRCG's

alleged

actions

settlement

consistently support their desire not to be bound until something
had been written and signed by both parties.

By failing to

recognize and apply the intent of the parties that any subsequent
agreements be signed by the parties, the trial court failed to
properly apply contract law principles to this case.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CROUSE AND HRC6 REACHED
A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR $34,536.62.
Although plaintiff argued the inapplicable doctrine of accord

and satisfaction (T 97:1-4, 161:5-8), the trial court apparently
applied the law of executory accord in reaching its decision.1
The law of executory accord, however, is merely the law of
contracts as applied to negotiation of substituted performance
under an existing agreement. 6 Corbin on Contracts, §§ 1268-1275;
Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Tel & Tel, 844 P2d 322, 326
(Utah 1992).

An offer to negotiate substituted performance does

not give rise to an accord.

Id., § 1270.

The same elements

required to establish the existence of a contract are required to
demonstrate

an

enforceable

accord,

i.e..

offer, acceptance,

consideration, etc.
HRCG's letters of October 2 and 4 can reasonably be construed
as offers. In order for those offers to become a contract, one of
them must be unconditionally accepted.

Ms. Crouse rejected the

October 2 offer and accepted the October 4 offer except for the
provisions of paragraph 8c. A conditional or limited acceptance

1

Accord and satisfaction is a common law doctrine invoked
as a defense in which a party may show that performance was
discharged by substituted performance agreed to by both parties.
In essence, the law of executory accord amounts to the first half
of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
11

of an offer is a rejection and a counter-offer.

Wadsworth

Construction v. City of St. George, 865 P2d 1373, 1376 (Utah App
1993), citing Candland v. Oldrovd 67 Utah 605, 248 P 1101, 1102
(1926).

An offer must be accepted in its entirety with no

reservations to constitute a contract.
The offeree must "manifest
a definite
intention to accept the offer and every part
thereof . . . without material reservations
or conditions."
Wadsworth at 1376, citing R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child. 122 Utah
194, 247 P2d 817, 819 (1952).

Crouse's acceptance of the offer

except for the provisions of paragraph 8c is therefore not a
valid, binding acceptance.
Crouse

testified

that

she

and

Thurston

subsequently

negotiated over paragraph 8c and reached an agreement as to that
provision.

At

trial, Crouse provided

no evidence

that the

language in the written offer requiring a writing signed by the
parties was challenged, negotiated or changed in any way.
improper

It is

for the trial court to assume, absent any evidence

supporting the assumption, that HRCG's frequently demonstrated
desire that its offer include the express requirement of a writing
was no longer a part of the offer when Crouse accepted it.
There is no evidence as to who made the final "offer" in the
negotiations which led to resolution of the dispute over paragraph
8c.

If Crouse did so, then the finished product was an offer by

Crouse to HRCG, containing all of the language in the October 4
letter, including the requirement for a signed writing.

If HRCG

made the last offer, then that same language applied to the offer
of HRCG to Crouse.
12

Crouse testified at trial that she did not enter into a
written

agreement

and that

she considered

resolution

of the

paragraph 8c issue to be the final element of an agreement between
the parties which required no further action.

T 43:17:25,45:25

to46:14, 94:25 to 95:2. It is clear from the evidence that Crouse
did not unqualifiedly accept the offer which included the language
requiring

the

agreement

to

be

in

writing.

That

limited

acceptance, excluding a provision material to the offeror, is not
a valid acceptance.
It is significant that, even after Crouse had concluded the
matter to be resolved, HRCG continued to negotiate, offering a
subsequent settlement offer based upon newly acquired facts. The
evidence shows that HRCG had not reached an agreement that the
matter had been settled. There was simply no meeting of the minds
as required by law.
If,

as

characterized

by

the

trial

court's

memorandum

decision, the offer was one "accepted" by Crouse then it was
accepted with the condition that no legal obligation ensue until
the agreement be reduced to a writing signed by both parties.
Neither Crouse nor any agent of HRCG signed such a writing.
Regardless of which party was the offeree of the last offer,
the evidence clearly shows that neither Crouse nor HRCG accepted
the offer in its entirety without conditions or reservations.
Lacking a proper acceptance, no contract was or could be formed.
Therefore, as a matter of law, there was no accord reached by the
parties.
A second requirement which must be satisfied in order to
conclude that an enforceable accord existed, is evidence of the
13

existence of contractual consideration or an accepted substitute
for consideration.
If

a

There is none in this case.

claim

is

undisputed

and

liquidated,

traditional

contractual consideration must be present to support an accord.
Estate Landscaping at 326.
unliquidated,

some

Where the claim is disputed and

substitute

for consideration,

e.g.,

detriment, must be present to support the accord.

legal

Id.

For

example, surrender of a legal right to dispute the amount at issue
satisfies the consideration requirement.

Id.

In the case of an

accord, an agreement without a relinquishment of a right to press
a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount causes the accord
to fail for lack of consideration.

Id.

There is no evidence that Crouse was attempting to enforce
any

contractual

right.

She

never

threatened

or

otherwise

discussed legal action. Apparently, her only bargaining lever was
the threat to terminate her relationship with HRCG.

The evidence

does show that HRCG entered negotiations with Crouse, willing to
pay

more

than

it thought

it was

responsible

for under the

Agreement, because it wished to continue the working relationship
with Crouse.

In other words, the consideration for HRCG to

negotiate the disputed amounts was Crouse's continued contractual
relationship

with

the

firm.

It

is

clear

that

this

same

consideration was not part of Crouse1s bargaining motivation. Her
sole motivation, according to her testimony, was to get the sums
she thought she was owed and not to liquidate the disputed amounts
or relinquish any disputed rights.

T 46:23-25.

There is no provision in the accord, express or implied, in
which

the

parties

relinquish
14

their

right

to

dispute

the

unliquidated amounts.

The sole consideration on HRCG's part,

Crouse's continued contractual relationship with the firm, failed
within days after the alleged accord.

In fact, it appears from

the record that Crouse had already sought new employment and may
have already accepted a job prior to the October 18 meeting.
Lacking legal consideration, the accord fails and is unenforceable
as a matter of law.
Contract law imposes contractual obligations only where a
valid offer has been accepted without qualification or reservation
and the ensuing agreement has legal consideration.

The same

requirements exist for finding a valid, enforceable accord.
the

present

case

requirements fail.

both

the

acceptance

and

In

consideration

The trial court, therefore, erred in finding

that HRCG had accepted the settlement offer creating an accord.
CONCLUSION
The weight of the evidence fails to support the trial court' s
finding that the parties had entered into an accord.

In fact, the

overwhelming evidence is that HRCG's words and actions not only
failed to demonstrate an agreement had been reached, but were
consistent with its desire that no agreement be effective until
placed into a writing signed by the parties.

Aside from the

factual question, the trial court failed to apply fundamental
principles of contract law in evaluating the issues before it in
this

case.

It

is

clear

that

HRCG

did

not

intend

legal

consequences to flow from its discussions with Crouse until an
agreement had been written and signed by the parties.
clear that there was no meeting of the minds.

It is also

There was no

unqualified acceptance of the offer as written and no legal
15

consideration to support an accord.

As a clear matter of law,

there was no enforceable accord between the parties.

/OfM
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Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1995.

CHRISTOPHER TOLBOE
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
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